国际企业管理_5.制度、文化和道德规范对跨国公司战略的影响

1、国际企业管理崔 浩中山大学管理学院工商管理系二一年四月一日第四讲回忆2国际化战略 跨国公司国际化动机比较优势理论要素禀赋理论产品生命周期理论新贸易理论 规模经济波特的钻石模型跨国公司理论内部化理论折衷模型 OLI知识本位观和跨国公司演化理论国际贸易理论亚当斯密，?国富论?绝对优势理论国家间也应该分工大卫李嘉图相对优势理论做自己擅长做的事情贸易可以解决生产率的差异，不需要对外投资要素禀赋理论同种商品的绝对价差本钱差异要素价差要素存量比率差异要素供给要素禀赋里昂惕夫悖论列昂惕夫1953 年利用美国投入产出模型计算了1947 年美国的贸易结构， 对赫克歇尔俄林的理论进行了实证分析列昂惕夫对要素禀赋理

2、论两度验证的结果都说明：作为资本密集型的美国，进口的资本密集型产品的数量远远大于劳动密集型产品数量美国对外贸易的结构和商品流向同历来被学术界奉为经典的要素禀赋理论明显地相互矛盾这样的验证结果无法用传统的贸易理论加以解释与说明，因此被称为“里昂惕夫悖论或“里昂惕夫之谜Leontief Paradox 里昂惕夫悖论列昂惕夫本人是赞成要素禀赋理论的作为“谜之始作俑者，列昂惕夫本人的解释：要素效率差异 ：美国生产要素的“高效率“在同一定数量资本的任何一种组合中，美国每一人年劳动说起来都应当相当于外国的3人年劳动 源于：卓越的企业家精神Entrepreneurship、一流的管理组织Superior O

3、rganization、相互促进的良好工作环境Favorable Environment美国进口的是低技能的资本密集型产品美国出口的是高技能的资本密集型产品 产品生命周期Vernon， 1966出口带动知识流动国家间生产本钱变动产品的生产在不同经济开展水平的国家间流动没有明确的说明直接对外投资活动兴旺国家间贸易比兴旺国家和开展中国家间贸易多很多倍新贸易理论Paul Krugman, 1983，New Trade Theory，规模经济同一行业，单一产品，两个大国，每个国家一个垄断者，在国际上形成寡头竞争如果A国开始征收关税，B国企业的规模经济下降，A过企业的规模经济上升，于是A国企业在国际市场

4、上的竞争力上升B国企业在A国投资贸易战的可能性“protected babies never grow新贸易理论关税，政府干预，规模经济也可以成为贸易的驱动力PTPWQW1QT23PT*PQSD本国市场PQXSMD世界市场PQS*D*外国市场新贸易理论关税后的国内市场SDPWS1D1Pw+tS2D2关税前进口：D1-S1关税后进口：D2-S2S1S2D2D1QPSDPT Pw新贸易理论P*T消费者损失 (a+b+c+d)生产者所得 (a)政府收入 (c+e)acebde ? b+d新贸易理论贸易条件改善所得： e效率损失： b+d新贸易理论：如果：禀赋价格差贸易那么：规模经济价格差贸易所以：大

5、国通过关税提高本国企业规模经济，增强国际竞争力实质上：政府参与贸易，牺牲本国公民福利，补贴本国厂商如果厂商不能在贸易条件改善的条件下增加效率，那么福利为净损失但是：“protected babies never grow而且：贸易战的可能性非常大国家竞争优势钻石模型跨国公司理论垄断优势理论 (Hymer-Kindleberger Tradition) Stephen Hymer, “International Operation of National Firms: A study of Direct Foreign Investment 根本前提：结构性市场不完全性structural ma

6、rket imperfection产品差异、营销技能不同 专利保护、技术秘密和管理水平等不同 规模经济 政府干预 企业的特定优势(firm specific advantage) 创新、本钱、融资或市场优势 跨国公司理论内部化理论 基于交易本钱的跨国公司理论Buckley & Casson, 1976五大因素共同促进跨国公司的快速开展：对技术密集型产品的需求增多对公司而言，知识产品的生产存在着规模经济这种知识产品的外部市场是不完全的国际通讯费用的降低企业通过内部转移定价transfer pricing减少税收支出的行为日益频繁。企业的内部化决定受四类因素的影响：行业特定因素：关于产品的特征和外

7、部市场的结构地区特定因素：包括地理位置和文化距离等等国别特定因素：东道国政府在政策、法律、经济等方面的政策企业特定因素：主要是指企业组织内部市场的协调和管理能力跨国公司理论John Dunning, 1981, “The Eclectic Paradigm企业有所有权优势 O选择有区位优势的国家或地区 L选择正确的内部化策略 I配合正确的国际化战略 S跨国公司理论知识本位观 - knowledge based-viewKogut & Zander, 1992, 1993跨国公司是在国家间转移知识的有效途径企业通过在全球范围内的学习获取知识知识在跨国公司内部传递形成独特的能力跨国公司通过对自身知

8、识的应用认识到核心竞争力跨国公司的超额收益来源于对这种核心竞争力的使用假设：知识的特性导致市场在传递知识上的低效率子公司是不一样的 异质的跨国公司理论文化距离的影响Edward T. Hall, 1960, “跨国商务中的无声语言, HBRGeert Hofstede, 1980，1991 主要影响区位选择和子公司管理制度距离的影响Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Xu & Shenkar, 2002规那么性距离Regulative distances名义性距离Normative distances认知性距离Cognitive distances主要

9、影响区位选择、进入方式和子公司管理跨国公司理论“The Transnational Solution, Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989跨国公司理论寻求全球效率的提高和对当地市场的适应难于实施，因为同时要求很强的中央控制和协调以实现高效率分权以实现对本地市场的适应企业必须通过组织学习来实现竞争优势跨国战略跨国公司理论 开展“外来者义务 liability of foreignnessZaheer, 1995, AMJ全球战略的吸引力在降低全球战略并不象以往一样流行实行全球战略越来越困难区域化 regionalizationRugman, 2005Fortune 500 公司里面

10、没有真正在“triad市场都均衡开展的强调某些区域而不是全球市场需要对于文化、法律和社会价值的更细致的理解地区总部的建立Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 623Firm Size, Domestic Market Size, and Propensity to InternationalizeFigure 6.1Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 624A Comprehensive Model of Foreign Market EntriesFigure 6

11、.2The Choice of Entry Modes: A Hierarchical ModelFigure 6.3第五讲 制度、文化和道德标准对跨国公司战略的影响26Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 427Opening Case: Behind the Profitability of Big PharmaQuestions:Why is the global pharmaceutical industry, represented by the Big Pharma, so profitable?What determ

12、ines the strategies and performance of firms in this industry?Answers:Industry-based answer: Five forcesResource-based answer: Firm resources and capabilitiesInstitution-based answer: What about the formal role of different governments? What about the informal norms of acceptable prices and practice

13、s around the world? What about the values and influences of various stakeholders?Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 428Prices of the Same United States-Developed Drugs Around the World (2003)Table 4.1Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 429Understanding InstitutionsInfo

14、rmal definition: “Rules of the gameFormal definition: “Humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction (North)Institutions certainly affect individual and firm behaviorsAn institution-based view of strategy:Covering institutions, cultures, and ethicsStrategists need to appreciate the “b

15、ig picture in which competition around the globe takes place.Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 430Understanding Institutions (contd)An Institutional FrameworkFormal and informal institutions that govern individual and firm behavior These formal and informal institutions are supporte

16、d by three “pillars (Scott)Table 4.2Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 431What Do Institutions Do?Institutions affect the strategy of firms by:Reducing uncertainty.Signaling conduct as acceptable or not, which constrains the range of acceptable actions.Uncertainty can lead to transac

17、tions costsTransaction costs: Costs associated with economic transactionsor more broadly, costs of doing businessA major source of transaction costs: Opportunism“Self-interest seeking with guile (Williamson)The possibility of opportunism introduces uncertaintyCopyright 2005 South-Western. All rights

18、 reserved. 432Why Is It Important to Reduce Uncertainty?Without stable institutional frameworksTransaction costs may be so high (e.g., extensive opportunism) that certain transactions would not take place.Example: If credible institutional frameworks are absent, investors may choose to put money abr

19、oad (e.g., capital flight from Russia).Investment is severely limited without an effective system of property rights (SIA 4.1: Argentina).However, certain informal institutions can substitute for a lack of formal property rights.Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 433How to Reduce Unc

20、ertainty?Two kinds of institutionsinformal and formal reduce uncertainty in economic transactionsRelational contracting: based on informal institutionsInformal, relationship-based, personalized exchange (Figure 4.1)Benefits outweigh costs, up to a certain point.Arms-length transaction: based on form

21、al institutionsFormal, rule-based, impersonal exchange with third-party enforcement (Figure 4.2)Benefits outweigh costs, when the scale and scope of the economy become very largeCopyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 434The Costs and Benefits of Informal, Relationship-Based, Personalized

22、 ExchangeFigure 4.1Source: M. W. Peng (2003), Institutional transitions and strategic choices (p. 279), Academy of Management Review, 28 (2): 275296.Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 435Informal InstitutionsConstraints on socially sanctioned norms of behavior.Professional norms do n

23、ot have the force of law, but are obeyed by those in a profession.Physicians, professors, lawyers, and accountantsCommercial norms are adhered to by most persons in a modern economy.In developing nations, personal relations substitute for formal institutions when commercial and professional norms ar

24、e not well established.Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 436Informal Institutions (contd)Informal institutions suggest expected behaviors Everyone knows these unwritten “rules (drinking with colleagues)If formal constraints fail, informal constraints play a larger role in reducing u

25、ncertaintyThis is especially important during institutional transitions Fundamental and comprehensive changes introduced to the formal and informal rules of the game that affect organizations as players“Transition economies: A subset of emerging economies, such as China, Russia, PolandThe importance

26、 of guanxi and blat during Chinas and Russias recent institutional transitions, respectivelyCopyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 437Source: M. W. Peng, 2003, Institutional transitions and strategic choices (p. 280), Academy of Management Review, 28 (2): 275296. Copyright 2003. Reprinte

27、d by permission of Academy of Management Review via Copyright Clearance Center.The Costs and Benefits of Formal, Rule-Based, Impersonal ExchangeCopyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 438Formal InstitutionsFormal InstitutionsAn expensive legal and regulatory framework of courts, police, l

28、awyers, regulators, and other mechanisms that enforce laws and regulations to facilitate the widening of marketsBenefits of Formal InstitutionsSupport arms-length transactions by bringing distant parties (strangers) together. Foster rule-based transactions that attract new players into a global econ

29、omy that cannot operate on informal institutions alone.Facilitate economic expansion and growthCopyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 439An Institution-Based View of StrategyInstitutional frameworks are more than the “task environmentThe Porter “diamond model: Determinants of national co

30、mpetitive advantage in certain industries (Figure 4.3)First published in 1990: Very influential However, it has been criticized because it ignores histories and institutionsThe institution-based view asks (for example): What is behind firm rivalry? (see Opening Case)Copyright 2005 South-Western. All

31、 rights reserved. 440The Porter Diamond: Determinants of National Competitive AdvantageFigure 4.3Source: Reprinted by permission of Harvard Business Review from “The competitive advantage of nations (p. 77) by Michael Porter, March/April 1990. Copyright 1990 by the Harvard Business School Publishing

32、 Corporation; all rights reserved.Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 441An Institution-Based View of Strategy (contd)Institutions are more than background conditionsInstitutions provide guidelines to firms as to how they can act, and what can be done with legal or other guarantees.In

33、stitutions directly impact a firms formulation and implementation of strategy (Figure 4.4). In two words: Institutions matter.The key question: How do they matter?Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 442Institutions, Firms, and Strategic ChoicesFigure 4.4Sources: Adapted from (1) M. W.

34、 Peng, 2000, Business Strategies in Transition Economies (p. 45), Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishing.; (2) M. W. Peng, 2002, Towards an institution-based view of business strategy (p. 253), Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 19 (2): 251267.Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 443Two C

35、ore PropositionsManagers and firms rationally pursue their interests and make strategic choices within institutional constraintsOpening Case: Japanese pharmaceutical firms do not as relentlessly pursue new innovations as US firms do.Closing Case: Why do some entrepreneurs choose to engage in counter

36、feiting?While formal and informal constraints combine to govern firm behavior, when formal constraints fail, informal constraints play a larger role Informal, political connections are helpful in both emerging and developed economiesCopyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 444The Strategic

37、 Role of Culture Culture“The collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another (Hofstede)Is the most informal and least codified part of a countrys institutional framework.Impacts the strategy of firms.Firms must understand cultural ru

38、le sets of the society in which they are doing business just as they must understand its legal regulations and professional and commercial norms.Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 445Hofstedes Dimensions of Cultural ValuesPower DistanceDistinguishes the levels of hierarchy accepted b

39、y the society.Individualism versus CollectivismFocuses on the importance of the individual versus the group in social and business situations.Masculinity versus femininityMeasures the degree of sex role differentiation.Uncertainty AvoidanceIdentifies the tolerance for ambiguity.Long-term Orientation

40、Emphasizes perseverance and savings for future betterment.Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 446Hofstede Dimensions of CultureaTable 4.3a. When the scores are the same, countries are listed according to their alphabetical order. Arab countries, East Africa, and West Africa are cluste

41、rs of multiple countries. Germany and Yugoslavia refer to the former West Germany and the former Yugoslavia, respectively. Sources: Adapted from G. Hosftede, 1997, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind (pp. 26, 53, 84, 113, 166), New York: McGraw-Hill. Data on the first four dimensions ar

42、e based on surveys of IBM employees during 196872, first published in G. Hosftede, 1980, Cultures Consequences, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publishing. Data on the fifth dimension are based on surveys of students during the 1980s, first published in The Chinese Culture Connections, 1987, Chinese values

43、and the search for culture-free dimensions of culture, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 18: 143164.Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 447Culture and StrategyPower DistanceFrench and Italian managers have a penchant for centralized authority; French and Italian subsidiaries abroa

44、d are more likely to have majority ownership control.Solicitation of subordinate feedback and participation (“empowerment), widely used in Western European and North American countries, is seen as a sign of weak leadership and low integrity in higher power distance countries (Egypt, India, Mexico, a

45、nd Russia).Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 448Culture and Strategy (contd)Individualism versus CollectivismIndividualist U.S. firms often desire to find ways to differentiate, whereas collectivist Japanese firms have a tendency to converge on a defensible position.Because entrepre

46、neurs are usually willing to take more risk, individualistic societies tend to foster relatively more entrepreneurship.Collectivism may result in relatively lower levels of entrepreneurship. Singapore and Japan currently score very low on entrepreneurship.Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights res

47、erved. 449Culture and Strategy (contd)Masculinity versus FemininityHigh masculinity countries“Good managers are typically assertive, decisive, and “aggressive (only in masculine countries does this word carry a positive connotation)Firms may have a relative advantage in mass manufacturing (e.g., Jap

48、an). High femininity countries Managers are less visible, more intuitiveFirms may have a relative advantage in small-scale, customized manufacturing, agricultural and forestry exports, and service industries (e.g., Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, and Denmark).Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights re

49、served. 450Culture and Strategy (contd)Uncertainty avoidanceManagers in low uncertainty avoidance countries (e.g., Great Britain) rely on experience and training.Managers in high uncertainty avoidance countries (e.g., China) rely more on rules and procedures.Example: The Swissair crash (1998)U.S. co

50、mmentators: Rules are there to be broken during emergencies!Swissair officials: Rules exist exactly for such emergencies! Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 451Culture and Strategy (contd)Long-term orientation: Cultures with long-term orientation nurture firms with longer horizons in

51、 strategic planning. Japanese and Korean firms are willing to forego short-term profits to focus more on market share.SIA 1.1: Matsushitas 250-year planWestern firms focus on short-term quarterly profitsChapter 10 Closing Case: In the oil industry, there is a recent tendency to shorten the planning

52、horizon from 10-15 years to 5 years or less. Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 452The Strategic Importance of CultureUnderstanding cultural differences is crucial, especially when competing internationally and globally.Culturally nave and ignorant firms may commit strategic blunders

53、.Chevy Nova car “No go in SpanishWhite Elephant brand battery from ChinaMitsubishi Motors in America: $34 million fine to settle sexual harassment charges in a low masculinity country (relative to Japan)Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 453The Strategic Role of EthicsEthics: Norms,

54、principles, and standards of conduct governing individual and firm behaviorEthics: Not only an important part of informal institutions, but also deeply reflected in formal laws and regulationsWhat is illegal is typically unethicalWhat is legal may be unethical (e.g., mass lay-off downsizing)What is

55、unethical is not always necessarily illegalRecent interest in business ethics:Fueled by unethical scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, etcEthics Officer Association: 12 member firms (1992) 1,000 firms (2004)In this book, ethics is not only emphasized here, but also throughout all chapters (see cri

56、tical discussion questions ON ETHICS in every chapter, especially Chapter 12)Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 454Views on Business EthicsA negative viewFirms are forced to jump on the ethics “bandwagon under social pressures while not necessarily becoming more ethical.A positive vi

57、ewFirms want to do it right regardless of social pressures.An instrumental viewEthics: A useful instrument for good profitsThe value of ethical reputation is magnified during a crisisInstitution-based explanationAll of the above may be accurate, for some firmsSee the Strategic Response Framework (Ta

58、ble 4.5)Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 455Managing Ethics OverseasEthical standards are different around the worldWhistle blowers, ethical in America, are unethical in JapanMicrosofts competitive actions, after surviving U.S. legal scrutiny, are found to be unethical and illegal

59、by the EUEthical relativismWhen in Rome, do as the Romans doEthical imperialismThere is only one set of good Ethics, and we have it!Three “middle-of-the-road guiding principlesRespect for human dignity and basic rights.Respect for local traditions (e.g., gift-giving)Respect for institutional context

60、sCopyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 456Transparency International Corruption RankingsTable 4.4Copyright 2005 South-Western. All rights reserved. 457A Strategic Response FrameworkTable 4.5Sources: Based on (1) A. Carroll, 1979, A three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate social