开放式创新演讲报告.ppt

Marcela Miozzo Research interests,Service firms: capabilities, strategy and structure, outsourcing, internationalisation, operation in DCs and LDCs Projects Anglo-German Foundation High-tech business services in Germany and the UK 2003 British Academy Larger Research grant The developmental role of knowledge intensive business services in Argentina and Brazil 2004-2005 ESRC Service multinational enterprise acquisitions and linkages in emerging economies, 2005-2008 ESRC, Using intellectual property protection to capture value from innovation in knowledge-intensive service firms, 2012- 2013 .,1,Selected publications services firms,Miozzo, M. and Yamin, M. (2012) Institutional and sectoral determinants of headquarters-subsidiary relations: a study of UK service multinationals in China, Korea, Brazil and Argentina, Long Range Planning, 45, 16-40. Massini, S. and Miozzo, M. (2012) Outsourcing and offshoring of business services: challenges to theory, management and geography of innovation, Regional Studies, 46 (9), 1219-1242. Miozzo, M. and Grimshaw, D. (2011) Capabilities of large services outsourcing firms: the outsourcing plus staff transfer model in EDS and IBM, Industrial and Corporate Change, 20, 3, 909-940. Grimshaw, D. and Miozzo, M. (2006) Institutional effects on the market for IT outsourcing: analysing clients, suppliers and staff transfer in Germany and the UK, Organisation Studies, 27, 9, 1229-1259. Miozzo, M. and Grimshaw, D. (2005) Modularity and innovation in knowledge-intensive business services: IT outsourcing in Germany and the UK, Research Policy, 34, 9, 1419-1439. Miozzo, M. and Soete, L. (2001) Internationalisation of services: a technological perspective, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 67, 2, 159-185.,2,Research interests,2. Science based firms: mergers and acquisitions, institutional effects on early firm formation, open innovation and governance Projects Institute for Small Business and Entrepreneurship / ESRC Research and Knowledge Exchange RAKE grant, Do cross border acquisitions affect local and regional knowledge creation, exchange and spillovers?: an analysis of knowledge-intensive firms in the UK, 2010 ESRC Follow on Funding, Funding gap or trap? Effect of foreign acquisitions of science-based firms on local knowledge transfer and spillovers, 2011 ORA (ESRC, NSF, DFG), Comparative entrepreneurship: development of early technological and organizational capabilities of new high tech firms” (UK, USA and Germany), 2014-2017?,3,Open innovation and governance: Innovation partnerships between industry and university in science-based sectors,Marcela Miozzo Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, UK (joint research with Steve Casper Keck Graduate Institute, USA ),Closed innovation model,Source: Chesbrough (2003:36),Open innovation model,Source: Chesbrough (2003:37),Outside-in process,Inside-out process,Coupled process,From closed to open innovation?,Motivation and aims of research,Over the past 25 years pharmaceutical companies have spent $billions on long-term partnerships with leading universities Many partnerships failed to produce important patentable innovations for pharmaceutical firms Aims of the research: understand relation between open innovation and governance (incomplete contracting challenges) show how different types of industry-university partnerships need the creation of varying governance arrangements, in terms of formal and informal contractual mechanisms used to manage partnerships,Theoretical background 1,Open innovation and governance: Open innovation helps explain when collaboration or contracting for technology and R West and Bogers, 2011). Literature tends to focus on how to acquire an existing innovation from an external source, contractual issues are often of a short-term, transactional nature(Hagedoorn and Ridder, 2012). We focus on the governance of the creation of innovation in an open innovation context. Most of the literature on open innovation is concerned with the search for external sources of innovation (that is, the identification of external partners which have already developed an innovation and access to this innovation). We focus on open innovation in science-based sectors. Science-based sectors face prolonged periods of risky investment in research and uncertain outcomes.,Theoretical background 2,Contracts and innovation, approaches to incomplete contracting: Importance of legally enforceable contracts: creation of more sophisticated legal arrangements e.g. price escalator devices in long-term supplier contracts (Schwartz, 1992; Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991). Importance of relational governance: social norms created within the context of long-term relations (MacNeil, 1978; Lamoreaux et al., 2003; Ellickson, 1991), learning by monitoring (Sabel, 1993), parties may structure processes of technical collaboration in ways that generate the relational contracting norms needed to collaborate successfully. Contracting for innovation: braiding of legally enforceable contracts and informal or relational practices to support collaboration. Particular contracts for innovation create a process for the regular and mutual exchange of information about each partys competences and willingness to collaborate, binding them to imprecisely defined common projects through increased switching costs (Gilson et al., 2009; 2010).,Methods,Interviews with alliance managers, both from industry and university, and senior managers of pharmaceutical firms Secondary: press articles, program reviews (UC Berkeley-Novartis) Patent and bibliometric data (USPTO and Web of Science),Methods,Key role of four dimensions of governance: whether there is co-location or not the type of funding provided by pharmaceutical firms the type of agreement on intellectual property the types of contracting,Innovation partnerships of pharmaceutical firms with universities,Rights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contracts Tapping-in partnerships with a light legal framework Contracting for innovation partnerships with biotech-like governance,1. Rights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contracts,Multi-year (unrestricted) funding in exchange for reach-through rights on IP developed in university (plus restricted funds for particular collaborative research) Examples: 10-year $140m in 1982 J and 5-year, $100m in 2007 Pfizer and Scripps.,1. Rights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contracts,Goals: Company: Collaborate with faculty from leading universities/research institutes (window on science especially for conglomerate chemical firms) Access to IP from leading university departments/research institutes University: General funds to hire new faculty or offer superior benefits to existing faculty and build infrastructure (PPG-Scripps led to 40,000 square-foot addition to molecular biology building and additional 100 scientists) Working with partners helps ensure that discoveries will benefit society,1. Rights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contracts,Agency problems: Universities and faculty both have incentives to preserve freedom of action over IP Universities: Receive money “upfront” (usually yearly payments), have an incentive to do minimum necessary to “service” partnership but otherwise maintain ownership of promising IP (i.e. to license elsewhere) Faculty: If an invention disclosure is picked-up by the industry partner, the faculty member loses freedom of action over that discovery, stronger financial incentives are available for faculty member to continue to develop the technology and license it at a later stage of development,1. Rights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contracts,Challenges to implement agreements: Difficult for pharmaceutical company to vet all information disclosures appropriately within time frame (60-90 days) Getting it to the “right person” “Not invented here” syndrome, especially during 1980s and 1990s when pharmaceutical firms ran large internally focused R&D departments Difficult to judge the scientific and commercial potential of very early stage disclosures, especially in biology,1. Rights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contracts,Strategies to preserve IP ownership by university despite rights deal: Faculty can disclose inventions at a very early stage (e.g. initial grant proposal) in which the commercial potential is not at all clear, which increases the “odds” that the pharmaceutical partner will “pass” on a deal Faculty can “take the invention out the back door” (study by Gideon Markham found that about 10% of patents invented by university faculty may be “back door” candidates) Alliance managers can use social capital/relational norms to ask for a “quick review” in order to preserve freedom of action for faculty,1. Rights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contracts,Problem of adverse selection: From the perspective of faculty NIH type funding preserves freedom of action over IP; “star scientists” can presumably find federal funding for most research Sponsored research is likely to be more appealing to junior faculty, or faculty without strong federal funding records,1. Rights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contracts,Problem of time inconsistency: The UCB Plant Genetics and Microbial Biology Department received a large portion of the $25 million in funding for sponsored research in service of the partnerships A research committee was formed to decide how to spend the money, but only UCB faculty had voting rights In the end, all 25 faculty members received research funds from the partnership, with little control/direction by Novartis Comment by a postdoc in the lab of Michael Freeling: there were “few strings” in accepting the money, as “they never told us what to do” (Lau, 2004). Novartis decided not to renew the partnership,1. Rights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contracts,Evidence that collaborations were not successful in leading to co-publications or technologies Bibliometric evidence Novartis - UCB: 1 co-authored papers PPG-Scripps: 5 co-authored papers J&J - Scripps: 19 co-authored papers Technologies emerging from partnerships for the companies: At least 50 start-up companies were started by Scripps faculty during the time of the PPG, J&J and Sandoz/Novartis deals (1985-2012) (San Diego Business Journal, 2012) Program Review found that Novartis did not license any technology over the course of the five year agreement with UC Berkeley Exception: J&J-Scripps partnership resulted in 4 technologies being in-licensed (J&J created a purpose-built organization to evaluate and commercialize technology derived from Scripps),1. Rights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contracts,Relational norms weak within formal contracts: A major problem with long-term rights-oriented partnerships is that industry partners had guaranteed large sums of money upfront through fixed yearly payments, limiting their ability to use financial incentives to steer research Early deals allowed industry participants to sit in on university research committees, but only as observers without voting rights. University alliance managers spent considerable time “arranging” research collaborations to help meet terms of partnerships,1. Rights-oriented partnerships emphasizing formal contracts,Summary: Goals of industry and university are not fully aligned The upfront, formal contracts plus reach through rights used by these partnerships do not create strong enough incentives or decision-making mechanisms to align universities, and especially “star faculty,” with the goals of the partnership Problems of adverse selection and time inconsistency In such cases, governance agreements need to help parties achieve cooperation The lack of co-location is an additional issue with many partnerships - next topic,2. Tapping-in partnerships with a light legal framework,Over the last 10-15 years pharmaceutical companies have opened new research facilities near by leading universities, with the goal of “tapping in” to university research Goal of industry is to promote collaboration with university scientists, tap in to external sources of knowledge creation while also creating capabilities to internalize it Novartis an early proponent, opened large R&D centers near MIT and UCSD/Scripps in late 1990s,2. Tapping-in partnerships with a light legal framework,Example: Genomics Institute of the Novartis Research Foundation (GNF) in 1999 in close proximity to Scripps and UCSD Strong academic orientation, director prominent chemist Peter Schultz, full professor at Scripps Signed “master agreements” with USCD and Scripps, no monetary contribution but in kind contribution instead, joint proposals reviewed by decision board, standard rules of inventorship,2. Tapping-in partnerships with a light legal framework,Co-publications between Novartis and regional academic scientists, 1997-2010: Note, Novartis Boston is much larger than GNF,2. Tapping-in partnerships with a light legal framework,Evidence of publication but few technologies: 158 articles co-authored by GNF and UCSD 2007-2012 Do not generate technologies for commercialization: Only 3 patents co-assigned to Scripps and Novartis scientists during 1997-2007 time period (i.e. patents resulting from collaborations) Preliminary evidence from Boston similar (many publications, few patents),2. Tapping-in partnerships with a light legal framework,Problem of conflict of interests: Academic scientists powerful bargaining position, have low incentives to orient collaborations towards commercial aims. Junior industry scientists have a strong incentive to publish in order to create career flexibility, private incentives to co-publish on important basic research without consideration of importance to his or her employer,2. Tapping-in partnerships with a light legal framework,Summary: Tapping in partnership aligns the incentives of both academic and industry scientist to collaborate in research Projects often used to generate early stage or preliminary data that could be used by junior faculty as the basis of federal grant proposals Due to the basic research emphasis, the partnership is unlikely to produce scientific findings with direct commercial applicability, such as small molecule drug candidates Partnership does not attract “entrepreneurial professors” to engage in collaborations,3. Contracting for innovation partnerships with biotech-like governance,Pharmaceutical companies see universities as important partners within increasingly distributed innovation networks to develop drugs Example 5-year, $85m in 2010 Pfizer-UC San Francisco, part of a program to develop a series of drug discovery partnerships with leading universities (similar partnerships have been launched by Pfizer with UCSD and a consortium of New York City universities); 7-year $90m in 2012 Merck-Scripps to create the California Institute of Biomedical Research (Calibr), led by Scripps professor Peter Schulz,3. Contracting for innovation partnerships with biotech-like governance,Complex governance arrangements that include upfront funding plus downstream payments to universities/participating faculty depending on milestones being achieved modeled on biotech Co-location of an industry lab near university collaborators dedicated to the partnership Governance structures designed to create strong relational contracting norms (braiding of legally enforceable contracts and informal or relational practices to support collaboration),3. Contracting for innovation partnerships with biotech-like governance,Example: Pfizer-UCSF partnership described by Pfizer as motivated by “open innovation” (in addition to $85m, open research centre near UCSF) Funding used to hire postdocs who can freely work in both academic and industry labs “The Pfizer and UCSF researchers can visit each others labs, conduct experiments together and participate in joint team-meetings” (quote from UCSF alliance manager, OBrien 2011) Master agreement defines clear IP rights, milestone payments, IP jointly owned, with Pfizer having an exclusive (time limited) option, terms of licence negotiated More focused, based on research at a more advanced stage than previous partnerships and focused on protein biologics, no conflict between the objective of drug development and academic mission to publish,3. Contracting for innovation partnerships with biotech-like governance,Governance designed to promote relational mode