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GAO-23-106080
UnitedStatesGovernmentAccountabilityOffice
ReporttoCongressionalCommittees
June2023
CYBERCRIME
Reporting
MechanismsVary,andAgenciesFaceChallengesinDevelopingMetrics
Highlightsof
GAO-23-106080,
areporttocongressionalcommittees
WhyGAODidThisStudy
Cybercrime(includingcyber-enabledcrime)generallyconsistsofcriminalactivitiesthattargetacomputerornetworkfordamageorinfiltrationorusetheinternettoconductcriminalactivity.CybercrimeintheUnitedStatesisincreasing,resultinginbillionsofdollarsinlossesandthreateningpublicsafety.However,theUnitedStateslackscomprehensivecybercrimedataandmonitoring,leavingthecountrylesspreparedtocombatcybercrime.TheBetterCybercrimeMetricsAct,enactedin2022,requiresDOJtodevelopataxonomyfortypesofcybercrimeandcyber-enabledcrimeandestablishacategoryinitsNationalIncident-BasedReportingSystemtocollectreportsforcybercrimefromlawenforcement.TheactalsoincludesaprovisionforGAOtoreportonexistingcybercrimereportingmechanisms.
Theobjectivesofthisreviewweretofocuson(1)existingmechanismsusedtoreportcybercrimeandcyber-enabledcrime,includingreportedstrengthsandlimitations;(2)differencesbetweendatareportedoncybercrimeorcyber-enabledcrimeandothertypesofcrime;and(3)challengesselectedagenciesreportedindefiningsharedmetricsforcybercrime.GAOidentifiedagencieswithkeyresponsibilitiesforidentifying,investigating,andprosecutingcybercrime.GAOrevieweddocumentationonagencymechanismsforreportingcybercrimedata,suchascasemanagementsystems.Italsointerviewedagencyofficialsregardingthesemechanisms,differencesbetweencybercrimeandothertypesofcrime,andchallengesinestablishingsharedmetrics.
View
GAO-23-106080.
Formoreinformation,
contactMarisolCruzCainat(202)512-5017
or
cruzcainm@
orGrettaL.Goodwin
at(202)512-8777or
goodwing@
.
June2023
CYBERCRIME
ReportingMechanismsVary,andAgenciesFace
ChallengesinDevelopingMetrics
WhatGAOFound
Federalagenciesuseavarietyofmechanismstocollectandreportdataoncybercrime.Themechanismsuseddependonwhethertheagency’smissionrelatedtocybercrimeisidentification,investigation,orprosecution.(Seefigure.)
TypesofAgencyMechanismsUsedforReportingCybercrime
Note:GAOidentified12agencies,includingtheDepartmentofJustice,FederalBureauofInvestigation,andInternalRevenueService;theentirelistisincludedinthereport.
Strengthsofthesemechanismsincludedspecificfunctionalityforcapturingcybercrimeattributestofacilitateinformationsharing.Limitationsincludedvariationsinhowsystemsclassifyandtrackcybercrimeandtheabsenceofacentralmechanismthatcollectsdataoncybercrime.Thesearepartlyduetothelackofanofficialorcommonlyagreed-ondefinitionofcybercrime.
Agenciesalsoidentifieddifferencesbetweendatareportedoncybercrime(includingcyber-enabledcrime)andothertypesofcrime.Forexample,cybercrimemaynotbeconsistentlytrackedbecauseitisnotalwaysassociatedwithaspecifictypeofoffense.Inaddition,victimsmaybehesitanttoreportcybercrimebecauseoflackoffamiliarityorreputationalconcerns.
Agenciesidentifiedchallengesindefiningsharedmetrics.Theseincludemeasuringtheextentandimpactofcybercrime,agreeingonadefinitionofcybercrime,andcoordinatingamonglawenforcementagenciesatvariouslevels.TheDepartmentofJustice(DOJ)effectivelydevelopingacybercrimetaxonomyandcategoryinitsnationalcrimereportingsystemshouldhelpaddressthesechallenges.GAOintendstomonitorfutureefforts,includingthosetodevelopcybercrimecategoriesandensureconsistentreporting.
UnitedStatesGovernmentAccountabilityOffice
Contents
Letter
Background
AgenciesUseVariousMechanismstoReportCybercrimeand
NotedStrengthsandLimitations
AgenciesNotedDifferencesbetweenReportingCybercrimeand
OtherCrimes
AgenciesIdentifiedChallengesinEstablishingCybercrimeMetricsAgencyComments
1
4
11
23
25
30
AppendixI
Objectives,Scope,andMethodology
32
AppendixII
GAOContactsandStaffAcknowledgments
35
Tables
Table1:Cybercrime-RelatedResponsibilitiesofSelectedAgencies
Table2:SelectedGAOReportsAddressingAspectsofCybercrimeandCyber-EnabledCrime
6
9
Figures
Figure1:TypesofMechanismsAgenciesinOurReviewUsedfor
ReportingCybercrime12
Figure2:FunctionalityThatSelectedAgencySystemsUsedto
CollectCybercrime-RelatedData20
Figure3:ChallengesinEstablishingCybercrimeMetrics26
Pagei
GAO-23-106080Cybercrime
Abbreviations
ATF
BureauofAlcohol,Tobacco,Firearms,andExplosives
BJS
BureauofJusticeStatistics
CCIPS
ComputerCrimeandIntellectualPropertySection
CISA
CybersecurityandInfrastructureSecurityAgency
DEA
DrugEnforcementAdministration
DHS
DepartmentofHomelandSecurity
DOJ
DepartmentofJustice
FBI
FederalBureauofInvestigation
FIRS
FieldInvestigativeReportingSystem
FinCEN
FinancialCrimesEnforcementNetwork
HSI
HomelandSecurityInvestigations
IC3
InternetCrimeComplaintCenter
IC3Net
IC3Network
IRS
InternalRevenueService
NIBRS
NationalIncident-BasedReportingSystem
NSD
NationalSecurityDivision
SLTT
state,local,tribal,andterritorial
USPIS
U.S.PostalInspectionService
ThisisaworkoftheU.S.governmentandisnotsubjecttocopyrightprotectionintheUnitedStates.ThepublishedproductmaybereproducedanddistributedinitsentiretywithoutfurtherpermissionfromGAO.However,becausethisworkmaycontaincopyrightedimagesorothermaterial,permissionfromthecopyrightholdermaybenecessaryifyouwishtoreproducethismaterialseparately.
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GAO-23-106080Cybercrime
Letter
441GSt.N.W.
Washington,DC20548
June20,2023
TheHonorableDickDurbin
Chairman
TheHonorableLindseyGraham
RankingMember
CommitteeontheJudiciary
UnitedStatesSenate
TheHonorableJimJordan
Chairman
TheHonorableJerroldNadler
RankingMember
CommitteeontheJudiciary
HouseofRepresentatives
Cybercrimegenerallyincludescriminalactivitiesthatspecificallytargetacomputerornetworkfordamageorinfiltrationorusecomputersastoolstoconductcriminalactivity.Inaddition,“cyber-enabled”crimecanrefertoavarietyoftraditionalcriminalacts,suchastheftorfraud,whicharecarriedoutovertheinternet.ThesetypesofcrimesintheUnitedStatesareincreasingandhaveresultedinhundredsofbillionsofdollarsinlosses,threateningpublicsafetyandeconomicsecurity.
Multiplefederalagencieshaveresponsibilitiestoprotectagainst,detect,investigate,andprosecutecybercrime.Forexample,theDepartmentsofJustice(DOJ)andHomelandSecurity(DHS)haveprominentrolesinaddressingcybercrimewithinthefederalgovernment.Stateandlocallawenforcemententitiesplaysimilarrolesattheirlevels.However,CongressandresearchershavefoundthattheUnitedStateslackscomprehensivecybercrimedataandmonitoring,leavingthecountrylesspreparedtocombatthecybercrimethreateningnationalandeconomicsecurity.
TheBetterCybercrimeMetricsAct,enactedMay5,2022,includesaprovisionforGAOtoreportontheeffectivenessofreportingmechanismsforcybercrimeandcyber-enabledcrimeintheUnitedStates.Italsoasks
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GAO-23-106080Cybercrime
ustoreviewdisparitiesinreportingdatabetweenthoserelatingtocybercrimeandcyber-enabledcrimeandothertypesofcrimedata.
1
Theobjectivesofthisreviewweretoidentify(1)theexistingmechanismsusedtoreportcybercrimeandcyber-enabledcrimeintheUnitedStatesandthestrengthsandlimitationsthathavebeenreportedinthesemechanisms,(2)thedifferencesbetweendatareportedoncybercrimeorcyber-enabledcrimeandothertypesofcrime,and(3)thechallengesselectedagenciesreportedindefiningsharedmetricsfortrackingcybercrimeandcyber-enabledcrimeintheUnitedStates.
Wefocusedthisreviewonselectedfederalagencieswithresponsibilitiesrelatedtocybercrime.Weidentifiedkeyagencieswithresponsibilitiesforidentifying,investigating,andprosecutingcybercrimebasedonareviewofpreviousGAOworkinthisarea
2
andbyconsultinginternalGAOstakeholderswithsubject-matterexpertise.Wealsosolicitedinputfromagencieswespokewithtoidentifyadditionalagenciesorofficesthatplayaroleincollectingdatarelatedtocybercrime.Asaresultofthisselection,wefocusedourreviewonthefollowingagencies:
DepartmentofHomelandSecurity
•UnitedStatesSecretService
•CybersecurityandInfrastructureSecurityAgency
•ImmigrationandCustomsEnforcement’sHomelandSecurity
Investigations
DepartmentofJustice
1BetterCybercrimeMetricsAct,Pub.L.No.117–116,§6,136Stat.1180,1181(May5,
2022)(34U.S.C.§30109note).
2See,forexample,GAO,VirtualCurrencies:AdditionalInformationCouldImproveFederalAgencyEffortstoCounterHumanandDrugTrafficking,
GAO-22-105462
(Washington,D.C.:Dec.8,2021);Cyberspace:TheUnitedStatesFacesChallengesinAddressingGlobalCybersecurityandGovernance,
GAO-10-606
(Washington,D.C.:July2,2010);andCybercrime:PublicandPrivateEntitiesFaceChallengesinAddressingCyber
Threats,
GAO-07-705
(Washington,D.C.:June22,2007).
Page2
GAO-23-106080Cybercrime
•FederalBureauofInvestigation(includingitsBaltimorefieldoffice,
3
CriminalJusticeInformationServicesDivision,andInternetCrimeComplaintCenter)
•DrugEnforcementAdministration
•BureauofAlcohol,Tobacco,Firearms,andExplosives
•ComputerCrimeandIntellectualPropertySection
•NationalSecurityDivision
•BureauofJusticeStatisticsDepartmentoftheTreasury
•InternalRevenueService-CriminalInvestigation
•FinancialCrimesEnforcementNetwork
U.S.PostalService
•U.S.PostalInspectionService
4
Toaddressourfirstobjective,wereviewedrelevantfederallaws,includingtheBetterCybercrimeMetricsActandtheUniformFederalCrimeReportingActof1988.
5
Inaddition,wereviewedagencypolicies,procedures,andotherdocumentationonprocessesforcollecting,tracking,sharing,andreportingdataoncybercrimeandcyber-enabledcrime.Wealsorevieweddocumentationforsystems(e.g.,databasesandcasemanagementsystems)usedbyagenciestocollect,track,share,andreportdataoncybercrimeandcyber-enabledcrime.Lastly,weinterviewedcognizantagencyofficialsabouttheirprocessesandmechanismsforcollectingandreportingdataoncybercrimeandcyber-enabledcrime,includingthestrengthsandlimitationsofexistingreportingmechanisms.
Toaddressoursecondobjective,wereviewedagencypolicies,procedures,anddocumentation.Further,wereviewedrelevantreportsfromGAOandothers,aswellasotherliterature.Wealsointerviewed
3WemetwiththeFBI’sBaltimoreFieldOfficetounderstandhowFBIfieldpersonnelmaycollectandreportdataoncybercrime.
4WhiletheDepartmentofDefense’sCybercrimeCenterplaysaroleinrespondingtocybercrimeandcyber-enabledcrime,wedidnotincludethecenterinourreviewbecause
itsmissionrelatedtocybercrimefocusesoninternalDepartmentofDefensematters.534U.S.C.§41303.
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GAO-23-106080Cybercrime
cognizantagencyofficialsregardingdifferencesinhowdataaboutcybercrimeandothertypesofcrimearecollectedandreported.
Toaddressourthirdobjective,wereviewedpriorGAOworkandotherrelevantreportsandliterature.Wealsointerviewedcognizantagencyofficialsaboutanychallengesthatexistindefiningsharedmetricsforcybercrimeandcyber-enabledcrime.Weanalyzedagencyresponsestoidentifythenumberofagenciesthatreportedexperiencingthechallenge,aswellasthefactorsthatcontributedtothechallenges.Additionaldetailsaboutourobjectives,scope,andmethodologyareinappendixI.
WeconductedthisperformanceauditfromMay2022toJune2023inaccordancewithgenerallyacceptedgovernmentauditingstandards.Thosestandardsrequirethatweplanandperformtheaudittoobtainsufficient,appropriateevidencetoprovideareasonablebasisforourfindingsandconclusionsbasedonourauditobjectives.Webelievethattheevidenceobtainedprovidesareasonablebasisforourfindingsandconclusionsbasedonourauditobjectives.
Associetyengagesinmorepersonal,business,andgovernmentalactivitiesonline,criminalsarealsoshiftingtheiractivitiesonlineandbecomingmoresophisticatedinexploitingvulnerablepopulationsandthreateningpublicsafetyandeconomicsecurity.Cybercrimeisabroadtermthatcanrefertoavarietyofillegalactivitiesthattargetpotentialvictimsonlineormakeuseoftheinternettocarryoutillicitactivities.Cybercrimecanincludevarioustypesofnetworkintrusionsforillicitgainorothermaliciouspurposes,suchasransomwareattacks.
6
Inaddition,traditionalcriminalactivitiesthatarefacilitatedbytheuseoftheinternet—sometimesreferredtoas“cyber-enabledcrime”—canincludefraud,identitytheft,andthesaleofillegalgoods.
Cybercrimescantargetindividuals,privatesectorcompanies,criticalinfrastructure,andgovernmentagencies.Forexample:
•InFebruary2023,theU.S.MarshalsServicereportedthatithadbeenthevictimofaransomwareattackthatimpactedastand-alonecomputersystemcontainingrecordsaboutongoinginvestigations,employeepersonaldata,andinternalprocesses.Theagencyreported
Background
6Ransomwareisaformofmalicioussoftwaredesignedtorenderanindividual’sororganization’sdataandsystemsunusable.Ransompaymentsarethendemandedinexchangeforrestoringaccesstothelockeddataandsystems.
Page4
GAO-23-106080Cybercrime
thatthesystemdidnotincludepersonaldetailsaboutpeopleenrolledintheFederalWitnessProtectionProgram,whoselivescouldbeindangerifpubliclyexposed.However,theattackersdidexfiltratesensitivefiles,includinginformationaboutinvestigativetargets.
7
•InMay2021,theColonialPipelineCompanywasavictimofaransomwareattackthatresultedinatemporarydisruptioninthedeliveryofgasolineandotherpetroleumproductsacrossmuchofthesoutheasternUnitedStates.Specifically,maliciousactorsreportedlydeployedransomwareagainstthepipelinecompany’sbusinesssystems.Toensurethesafetyofthepipeline,thecompanyproactivelydisconnectedcertainsystemsthatmonitorandcontrolphysicalpipelinefunctionssothattheywouldnotbecompromised.Disconnectingthesesystemsresultedinatemporaryhalttoallpipelineoperations,thoughtheseweresubsequentlyresumed.
•InDecemberof2020,thecybersecurityfirmFireEyediscoveredthataSolarWindsproductknownasOrionwascompromisedandbeingleveragedbyathreatactorforaccesstoSolarWinds’customersystems.AccordingtotheSolarWindsChiefExecutiveOfficer,hackersbreachedthecompany’snetworkasearlyas2019.TheyinsertedmaliciouscodeintoOrion—aproductwidelyusedinboththefederalgovernmentandprivatesectortomonitornetworkactivityandmanagedevices.Thethreatactor,theForeignIntelligenceServiceoftheRussianFederation,usedOriontobreachseveralfederalagencynetworks.Theinitialbreachopenedabackdoortoagencysystemsthatenabledthethreatactortodeliveradditionalmaliciouscode.Thisallowedthemtomovelaterally,gatheringinformationandcompromisingdata.
•Between2017and2021,theFBI’sInternetCrimeComplaintCenter(IC3)receivedanaverageof552,000complaintsperyear.Theseincludecomplaintsofextortion,identitytheft,personaldatabreach,nonpaymentornondelivery,andphishing.
8
Inits2021annualreport,IC3estimatedatotallossof$18.7billionoverthisperiodresultingfromtheseincidents.
9
7Exfiltrationistheunauthorizedtransferofinformationfromaninformationsystem.
8Phishingisatechniqueforattemptingtoacquiresensitivedata,suchasbankaccountnumbers,throughafraudulentsolicitationinemailoronawebsiteinwhichtheperpetratormasqueradesasalegitimatebusinessorreputableperson.
9FederalBureauofInvestigation,InternetCrimeReport2021,accessedMarch17,2023,
/Media/PDF/AnnualReport/2021_IC3Report.pdf.
Page5
GAO-23-106080Cybercrime
•State,local,tribal,andterritorial(SLTT)governmentorganizations,includingschools,havebeenparticularlytargetedbyransomwareattacks.Theseattackscanhavedevastatingimpactsonvitalgovernmentoperationsandservices.AccordingtotheMulti-StateInformationSharingandAnalysisCenter—anindependent,nonprofitorganization—SLTTorganizationsexperiencedapproximately2,800ransomwareincidentsfromJanuary2017throughMarch2021.
FederalAgency
ResponsibilitiesCybercrime
RolesandRelatedto
Anumberofagenciesacrossthefederalgovernmenthavevariousrolesandresponsibilitiesrelatedtocybercrime,includinginformationgathering,investigation,andprosecution(seetable1).
Table1:Cybercrime-RelatedResponsibilitiesofSelectedAgencies
Agency
Responsibilities
DepartmentofJustice(DOJ)
ProsecutingcybercrimeviaU.S.Attorneys’Offices,ComputerCrimeandIntellectualPropertySection,and—incasesthatinvolvenation-stateactors—theNationalSecurityDivision.
BureauofJusticeStatistics(StatisticalagencyofDOJ)
Collecting,analyzing,publishing,anddisseminatinginformationoncrime,criminaloffenders,victimsofcrime,andtheoperationofjusticesystemsatalllevelsofgovernment.
Providingfinancialandtechnicalsupporttostate,local,andtribalgovernmentstoimproveboththeirstatisticalcapabilitiesandthequalityandutilityoftheircriminalhistoryrecords.
AdministeringtheNationalCrimeVictimizationSurvey.
FederalBureauofInvestigation(ComponentofDOJ)
Investigatingcyberthreatsandcomputerintrusions.
Generating,viatheCriminalJusticeInformationServicesUniformCrimeReportingprogram,statisticsforusebylawenforcement,includingforcyber-relatedcrimes.
Collectinganddisseminating,viatheInternetCrimeComplaintCenter,reportsfromthepubliconsuspectedinternet-facilitatedcriminalactivity.
BureauofAlcohol,Tobacco,Firearms,andExplosives(ComponentofDOJ)
Enforcinglawsrelatedtotheillegaluseandtraffickingoffirearms,theillegaluseandstorageofexplosives,actsofarsonandbombings,actsofterrorism,andtheillegaldiversionofalcoholandtobaccoproducts.Thiscanincludeinvestigationsofinternet-facilitatedcrimesintheseareas.
DrugEnforcement
Administration
(ComponentofDOJ)
EnforcingthecontrolledsubstanceslawsandregulationsoftheUnitedStates,includinginvestigatingillegaldrugtrafficking.Thiscanincludeinvestigationsofinternet-relatedcrimessuchastheuseofthe“darkweb”aorcryptocurrencytofacilitateorfinancesuchactivities.
U.S.SecretService
(ComponentofDepartmentofHomelandSecurity[DHS])
ProtectingU.S.financialinfrastructureandpaymentsystemsbyinvestigatingcyber-enabledfinancialcrimes(e.g.,wirefraud,creditordebitcardfraud,bankfraud,identitytheft,andmoneylaundering)andcyberattacks(e.g.,intrusions).
HomelandSecurity
Investigations
(ComponentofDHS)
Investigatingtransnationalcrimeandthreats,specificallythosecriminalorganizationsthatexploittheglobalinfrastructurethroughwhichinternationaltrade,travel,andfinancemove.Theseincludecyber-relatedcrimessuchasnetworkintrusions,toincludeexfiltrationofexport-controlleddataandintellectualproperty,financialfraud,launderingofcryptocurrency,darkwebnarcoticstraffickingandonlinechildsexualexploitation.
CybersecurityandInfrastructureSecurityAgency(ComponentofDHS)
Leadingthenationalefforttounderstand,manage,andreducerisktocyberandphysicalinfrastructure.Thisincludescollectingcyberincidentreportsfromcriticalinfrastructureentitiesandotherstakeholders.b
Page6
GAO-23-106080Cybercrime
Agency
Responsibilities
InternalRevenueService
CriminalInvestigationDivision(ComponentoftheDepartmentoftheTreasury)
InvestigatingpotentialcriminalviolationsoftheInternalRevenueCodeandrelatedfinancialcrimes,includingcyber-relatedviolations.
FinancialCrimesEnforcementNetwork
(ComponentoftheDepartmentoftheTreasury)
SafeguardingtheU.S.financialsystemfromillicituseandcombatingmoneylaunderinganditsrelatedcrimes(includingterrorism).
Promotingnationalsecuritythroughthestrategicuseoffinancialauthoritiesandthecollection,analysis,anddisseminationoffinancialintelligence.
CollectingSuspiciousActivityReportsfromfinancialinstitutionsthatidentifysuspectedcasesofmoneylaunderingorfraud,includingthoseinvolvingcybereventsorcyber-enabledcrime.
U.S.PostalInspectionService(ComponentoftheU.S.PostalService)
EnforcingfederallawscoveringcrimesthatincludefraudulentuseoftheU.S.Mailandthepostalsystem,andinvestigatinganycrimewithanexustothemail.Thesecrimesincludemailtheft,mailfraud,financialfraud,identitytheft,robberiesandburglariesofpostalfacilities,assaultsandthreatsonpostalemployees,investigationsofdangerousandprohibitedmails,narcotics,andcybercrime.
Source:GAOsummaryofagencyinformation.|GAO-23-106080
aThedarkwebisahiddenpartoftheinternetthatuserscanaccesswithspecializedsoftwaretocommunicateanonymouslyandengageinillegalactivitywithlittleriskofdetection.
bCriticalinfrastructureincludestheassets,systems,facilities,networks,andotherelementsthatsocietyreliesupontomaintainnationalsecurity,economicvitality,andpublichealthandsafety.Thisincludesenergy,watersystems,commercialfacilities,transportationinfrastructure,andinformationandcommunicationsnetworks.IntheU.S.,thisphysicalandcyberinfrastructureistypicallyownedandoperatedbytheprivatesector,thoughsomeisownedbyfederal,state,orlocalgovernments.
TheBetterCybercrime
MetricsActIsIntendedtoImproveDataandReportingonCybercrime
Variousorganizationsandresearchershavereportedlimitationsindataaboutcybercrimeandcyber-enabledcrime.Thisincludestheunderreportingofcybercrime,
10
difficultiesobtainingandusingdigital
10CassandraDodgeandGeorgeBurruss,“Policingcybercrime:Respondingtothegrowingproblemandconsideringfuturesolutions,”TheHumanFactorofCybercrime(Routledge,2019).
Page7
GAO-23-106080Cybercrime
evidence,
11
gapsintheclassificationofcrimessuchascybercrime,
12
andthelackofcomprehensivereporting.
13
TheBetterCybercrimeMetricsAct,enactedinMay2022,isintendedtoaddressdeficienciesinthereportingofcybercrimedataandestablishreportingmechanismsforcybercrime.
14
Inpassingthelaw,Congressfoundthat
•publicpollingindicatesthatcybercrimecouldbethemostcommoncrimeintheUnitedStates;
•theUnitedStateslackscomprehensivecybercrimedataandmonitoring,leavingthecountrylesspreparedtocombatcybercrimethatthreatensnationalandeconomicsecurity;and
•thepeopleoftheUnitedStateshavefacedaheightenedriskofcybercrimeduringtheCOVID–19pandemic.
TheactrequiresDOJto,amongotherthings,enterintoanagreementwiththeNationalAcademyofSciencestodevelopataxonomyforcategorizingdifferenttypesofcybercrimeandcyber-enabledcrimewithin90daysoftheact’senactment.Also,theyaretodelivertoCongressareportdetailingandsummarizingthetaxonomywithin1yearofenteringintothisagreement.Inaddition,theactrequiresDOJ,within2yearsoftheenactmentoftheact,toestablishacategoryintheNationalIncident-BasedReportingSystem(NIBRS),oranysuccessorsystem,forthecollectionofcybercrimeandcyber-enabledcrimereportsfromfederal,
11WilliamA.CarterandJenniferC.Daskal(authors)andWilliamCrumpler(contributor)“Low-HangingFruit:Evidence-BasedSolutionstotheDigitalEvidenceChallenge”(CenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies:July2018).
12NationalAcademiesofSciences,Engineering,andMedicine,ModernizingCrimeStatistics:Report1:DefiningandClassifyingCrime(Washington,D.C.:TheNationalAcademiesPress,2016)./10.17226/23492;NationalAcademiesofSciences,Engineering,andMedicine,ModernizingCri
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