NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEM AND INEQUALITY RUSSIA

1、national innovation system and inequality:russiapreliminary stanislaw zaichenkohigher school of economicshttp:/brics.redesist.ie.ufrj.br the brics project is a comparison between the national innovation systems of brazil, russia, india, china and south africa. it is a project conducted by the global

2、 research network for learning, innovation and competence building systems globelics (see ) and redesist the research network on local productive and innovative systems at the economics institute of the federal university of rio de janeiro brazil. conceptually, the project is struct

3、ured around the systems of innovation framework. the central focus of the study is the national innovation system (nis) of the five brics. the notion of innovation system has in its centre the industrial, s&t and education sub-systems; but includes also the legal and political frameworks, investment

4、 and financial sub-system, as well as other spheres relating to the national and international contexts where knowledge is generated, used and diffused. the objective is to characterize and compare the nis of the five countries pointing out convergences, divergences, and synergies, as well as identi

5、fying current and potential connections. particular attention will be given to policy implications. therefore, the project aims at involving, not only researchers, but also policy-makers working in national and international agencies.specifically the project aims at:(a) stimulating interactions and

6、the exchange of experiences between researchers and policy-makers interested in innovation in brics aiming at creating capabilities and finding joint workable solutions;(b) characterizing the structure of brics national innovation systems, their recent evolution and perspectives;(c) comparing the fi

7、ve countries innovation systems, identifying differences and similarities, common bottlenecks and complementarities; (d) developing and using concepts and information capable of representing the innovation systems of brics; (e) discussing policy implications and put forward policy recommendations, e

8、xtracting lessons that can be useful not only for these countries but also for other developing countries.the project is coordinated by jos cassiolato (redesist) and bengt-aake lundvall (aalborg university denmark). country coordinators are: in brazil, jos cassiolato, redesist, ie/ufrj; in india, k.

9、e. joseph , centre for development studies, trivandrum; in south africa, rasigan maharajh, tshwane university of technology; in china, liu xielin, chinese academy and in russia, leonid gohkberg, higher school of economics, moscow.national innovation system and inequality:russiamoscowabstractthis pap

10、er examines key factors, nature and structure of inequality in russia in the context of the national system of innovation (nsi). it begins with the common overview of the inequality patterns in russia including historical background and some basic perspectives including an interpersonal aggregate, c

11、ross-regional and social group dimensions. this is followed by analysis of interdependence between particular inequality issues and the nsi development prospects. the discussion concerns such topics as sectoral configuration, access to the basic infrastructures including health, education, finance e

12、tc, employment, productivity and wages issues.summary1. trends and patterns in inequality11.1. the historical roots11.2. interpersonal inequalities31.3. interregional inequalities101.4. inequality across social groups182. co-evolution of innovation system and inequality222.1. changing context of nat

13、ional system of innovation and production222.2. access to health and education262.3. access to knowledge, r&d and innovation infrastructure312.4. access to financial infrastructure392.5. output & employment432.6. nature of employment452.7. inter-sectoral wages/productivity differential and their bea

14、ring on inequality482.8. regional disparities in competence building institutions and production513. concluding remarks53references54 av. pasteur 250 - urca rio de janeiro- rj cep 22290-240 tel. 55-21-3873.5279 fax 55-21-2541 8148www.redesist.ie.ufrj.brnational innovation system and inequality: russ

15、ia1. trends and patterns in inequality1.1. the historical rootsrussia has a long history but the russian empire became a world power for the fist time only under the romanov dynasty and peter i the great. peters reforms brought european cultural influences to russia, providing grounds for further tr

16、ansition of the russian feudal setup towards more liberal society.in 1724 peter founded the russian academy of sciences and arts the first official entity in russia performing r&d on the regular basis. there was also created a system of professional schools and academies in engineering, medicine, na

17、vigation, military science etc. at the same time peter i established primary schools and declared compulsory primary education for the nobles. spreading of knowledge was accompanied by rapid development of printing-houses (including private ones), creation of official education programmes and manual

18、s, establishing public museums and academic libraries. in 1755 the moscow state university (the first university in russia) was founded. these reforms were the first step towards wide access to knowledge and competences.catherine ii (catherine the great), being at reign from 1762 to 1796, continued

19、the efforts to establish russia as one of the most progressive counties in europe. during this period public schools and public libraries became widespread and open for all classes of society. the unified official standards for general education were created. the prevalence of serfdom and the conser

20、vative policies of tsar nicolas i impeded the development of russia in the mid-nineteenth century. nicholass successor alexander ii (18551881) enacted significant reforms, including the abolition of serfdom in 1861; these great reforms spurred industrialisation.alexander ii also carried out signific

21、ant reforms in science and education. he established free access to professional and higher education for all social classes and for women. as a result, by the end of his reign about 40 thousand people obtained higher education degrees and more than 200 thousand - secondary education degrees. new te

22、chnologies were rapidly spreading in russia: electric spark lamps, wire telegraph etc.the most significant reform of that period was the serfdom abolition in 1861. it was the turning point, opening freedom guarantees for all strata. but it did not affect the inequality proportions as such.however, m

23、any socio-economic conflicts were aggravated during alexander iiis reign and under his son nicholas ii. it was the period of the revolutionary socialist movement beginning. although nicholas ii retained much of his power, he was forced to concede major reforms, including guaranties for the freedom o

24、f assembly, suffrage, political parties legalisation, and the creation of an elected legislative assembly (the duma).in 1914 russia entered world war i. although the army was far from defeat in 1916, the already-existing public distrust of the regime was deepened by the rising costs of war, casualti

25、es (russia suffered the highest number of both military and civilian deaths of the entente powers), and tales of corruption and even treason in high places, leading to the outbreak of the russian revolution of 1917. following the october revolution, a civil war broke out between the new regime and t

26、he socialist revolutionaries. the russian sfsr together with three other soviet republics formed the soviet union on december 30, 1922. the soviet system was proclaimed the first regime guaranteeing total equality by income, access to knowledge, skills and political activities. e.g. higher education

27、 institutions responded to political directives aimed at tailoring higher education for the masses and the training of proletarian specialists, particularly engineers. however this equality was mostly illusory. all property belonged to the state, and the financial resources inequality was replaced b

28、y administrative resources disparity.after lenins death in 1924, joseph stalin took power. he launched a centralised command economic system, rapid industrialisation processes and collectivisation of agriculture. during a short period the soviet union was transformed from an agrarian society to a po

29、werful industrial economy. however millions of soviet people died as a consequence of stalins harsh policies. it was the time of all civil liberties violation and total fear. after stalins death, the subsequent russian leader nikita khrushchev denounced stalins regime and eased his repressive polici

30、es. the next period of the soviet history was characterised by slow economic stagnation. it was time of leonid brezhnev leadership. in 1985 the first soviet president mikhail gorbachev announced a new course of development. his new policies were based on “glasnost” (openness) principle and “perestro

31、ika” (restructuring) reforms. soviet people were given a hope for the natural balance between equality and liberty. even in stagnation the soviet economy was the second largest in the world and still could provide free equal access to wealth, education, and health until the ussr collapse. but during

32、 its last years, the economy was afflicted by shortages of goods in shops, huge budget deficits and explosive growth in money supply leading to inflation. in august 1991, an unsuccessful military coup against gorbachev aimed at preserving the soviet union led to its definitive collapse instead.in ru

33、ssia, boris yeltsin came to power and declared the end of the communist regime. the ussr was separated into fifteen independent republics and was officially dissolved in december 1991. during and after the disintegration of the ussr when wide ranging reforms including privatisation and market and tr

34、ade liberalization were being undertaken, the russian economy went through a major crisis. this period was characterised by deep contraction of output, with gdp declining by roughly 50 percent between 1990 and the end of 1995 and industrial output declining by over 50 percent.in october 1991, it was

35、 officially announced that russia would proceed with radical, market-oriented reform by the way of shock therapy, as recommended by the united states and international monetary fund (fagen, 1992). price controls were abolished, privatisation was started. millions people were plunged into poverty. ac

36、cording to the world bank, in the late soviet era 1.5% of the population was living in poverty, but by mid-1993 this value increased up to 39-49% (milanovic, 1998). delays in wage payment became regular (with millions employees being paid their salaries months and even years later). the long depress

37、ion was followed by the social decay. social services collapsed and the birth rate plummeted while the death rate considerably increased.one more disaster happened in 1993 when a constitutional crisis resulted in the worst civil strife in moscow since the october revolution. and in 1994 the first ch

38、echen war started. all these shocks developed into deep socio-economic crisis. in the late 1990s high budget deficits and the 1997 asian financial crisis caused the financial crisis of 1998 and resulted in further gdp decline. it was the last economic shock in russia till the end of 2008.box 1 - sum

39、mary for (1.a) “the historical roots”1. in terms of inequality the russian history includes five evolutionary stages. the first one starts from the reforms of peter i and lasts until the selfdom abolition in 1861. it was the period of slow adaptation of basic equality and freedom concepts to the feu

40、dal system.2. however this task was impossible neither on the feudalism grounds nor under the following political crisis. the liberty and equity principles transformed into revolt. therefore it was a very short and unstable stage.3. the third period began with the socialist revolution and the new so

41、viet regime. the total freedom and equality were proclaimed, however these declarations were rather just a cover for exploitation and totalitarian power (mostly under the stalins regime). inflexible soviet system started collapsing by the mid-1980s.4. in 1985 the first (and the last) soviet presiden

42、t gorbachev took a shot at new european-like system based on combination of liberalism and high social guarantees of the state. however the soviet economy could not bear such a load and collapsed finally by the early 1990s.5. the fifth period was characterised by severe socio-economic crisis followi

43、ng the transition to the market economy. the 1990s were the time of not just an inequality burst, but rather a total pauperisation of the whole population. only in the early 2000s the russian economy became stable and performed growth.6. however this stage may be already finished by the current worl

44、d economic crisis. it is not clear by now in what extend the russian economy would change by the shock.1.2. interpersonal inequalitiesthe gini coefficient (gc) indicates income disparity floating from zero (a perfect income distribution) to one (the richest obtain all the income). it is quite an “ag

45、gregate” indicator but still informative enough to take a look at dynamics and international comparisons. when the soviet union collapsed, russia had a gc of 0.29. income disparity took off in russia during the 1990s, but even with the booming economy in the 2000s, russias gc barely changed. it reac

46、hed 0.4 in 2000 and has only a bit increased during the next years (figure 1).figure 1 - gini coefficient dynamics in russia (1992-2008) source: the federal state statistics service data available at http:/www.gks.ruthis level is close to the brics average (0.494) as well as to the us value (table 1

47、). however the gc value does not reflect the inequality structure as such. e.g. a deeper analysis shows that gc calculated for households (instead of individuals) and corrected by the regional purchasing power is usually lower by 15-17% than official values in russia (besstremyannaya et al, 2005).ta

48、ble 1 - gini coefficient international comparisonbricsbrazil0.567 (2005)russia0.415 (2008)india0.368 (2004)china0.470 (2007)south africa0.650 (2007)eu(25)0.310 (2009) est.usa0.463 (2007)source: cia, 2009the main income shock in russia took place in 1991-1992. it was the time when the real income fel

49、l dramatically after transition from fixed prices to free market, and the price index grew up to 26. as a result, by the end of 1992 about 80% of households in russia appeared below the minimal consumer basket price level however this fact forced the government to review the minimal consumer basket

50、price level. but even after that about 1/3 of russians had income below the poverty line. . during the next five years the income level did not improve significantly by two reasons: economic decline (the 1997 gdp amounted for 63% of the 1990 value) and huge wage dept (as well as social payments debt

51、). the second income shock occurred in 1998 as a result of the financial crisis. however it did not contribute much to inequality growth as it was in 1991-1992. by that time the households already had abilities necessary for survival in the “wild market” environment. this mechanism is reflected by 1

52、5.2-points gap (1998) between the real income and the real wages (figure 2). by 2005 this difference amounted for 25.7 points. the third crisis started in the end of 2008, but its consequences for households are still not clear.figure 2 - real income, real wages and real pension per capita, % (1991

53、= 100%): 1991-2004source: besstremyannaya et al, 2005the income structure has changed significantly after the market reforms (figure 3). first of all the “other income” share grew by 8.6 times. this income source can be defined as “hidden wages” (undocumented labor earnings the shadow economy sector

54、). the self-employment activities in 2003 took 3.2-fold higher share compared with 1990. the buffer composed by these two sources and the rent income (46.4% in total) provides not only a mechanism for survival facing the economic instability, but also a strong motivation for labor mobility, developi

55、ng new competences and lifelong learning.figure 3 - the income structure transformation (1990-2003)source: besstremyannaya et al, 2005though the russian households perform some adaptation mechanisms, they still have little ability for the income base expansion. typically about 70% of their spending

56、is allocated for basic current needs like food, transport, clothes, housing bills etc (figure 4). at the same time demand for potentially innovation-intensive goods and services is supported by only 16% of spending (marked with the red line). this set includes household articles and appliances (7%),

57、 communication (4%), health (3%), and education services (2%). the first two items potentially include high-tech products while the latter two provide grounds for innovative adaptation and self-development. however in 2002 this share was even 4 points less.figure 4 - the russian households spending

58、structure (2002-2007)source: calculated using the federal state statistics service datahousehold purchasing capacity and receptivity to innovation influences the consumption of innovative goods and services inside the above-mentioned 16% segment. according to the national survey only 7% of population is ready to purchase innovative products (figure 5). anot