股权分置改革论文：后股权分置时期大股东控制与公司资本性投资

股权分置改革论文：后股权分置时期大股东控制与公司资本性投资【中文摘要】目前学术界对公司治理存在的主要利益冲突的研究集中到了大股东与中小股东之间。而在我国上市公司中,特殊的转轨经济体制导致了我国“国有股一股独大”,这样一种特殊股权结构的存在,就导致了我国上市公司大股东与中小股东的利益冲突更为严重。很多情况下表现为大股东及内部人对上市公司的超强控制,而正是“国有股一股独大”的股权结构也使得公司治理机制严重弱化。而且在现阶段我国各项法律制度不尽完善,监管还不到位的情况下,大股东或其内部人能够左右着公司各项财务和经营决策,因而我国上市公司资本性投资行为特征也体现着侵占的烙印。大股东的超强控制抑制了公司内部治理机制的发挥,同时也严重阻碍了资本市场的健康发展,也扰乱了正常市场经济秩序。正因为如此,股权分置改是对我国不合理的股权结构进行一次改良。本文在系统的回顾国内外学者对公司投资行为研究文献的基础上,结合我国大股东控制这一股权特征,选取了现金流权比例、控制权比例、两权分离度和控制人性质四个变量,同时考虑到股权分置改革可能导致的股权结构的变化和公司治理机制的完善,对我国上市公司在大股东控制下资本性投资行为进行研究,同时考虑股权分置改革对大股东控制及其控制下公司投资行为所产生的影响。研究结果显示：我国存在着大股东一股独大的股权结构,在公司治理机制被弱化,制度监管又比较薄弱的情况下,我国上市公司普遍存在过度投资行为,并且投资具有自由现金流敏感,自由现金流越多,过度投资越严重；相比非国有上市公司而言,国有上市公司中发生的非效率投资更为严重；现金流权比例的提高有助于缓解公司的过度投资行为,股权分置改革能有效增加这种缓解作用；两权分离度的降低能抑制过度投资行为的发生,股改同样能增强这种抑制效应；但控制权比例的减少并没能达到与预期一致的效果；股权分置改革前企业过度投资严重,股权分置改革后过度投资变得不显著,说明股权分置改革对公司过度投资行为有了一定的矫正作用,缓解了公司过度投资行为的发生,提高了公司的投资效率。并且股权分置改革对国有控股公司过度投资的抑制作用明显高于对非国有控股公司的抑制作用。【英文摘要】The main Research about the corporate governance is about the conflicts of interest between the large shareholders and small shareholders, in China, special economic system led to Chinas character that “the dominance of state-owned shares”, this Special ownership structure led the conflicts between the major shareholders and the minority shareholders of listed companies More serious. In many cases the performance of large shareholders and insiders of the super control of listed companies, and it was “due to the dominance of state-owned shares” of the ownership structure also makes a serious weakening of corporate governance. And at this stage, the legal system and Regulators is not perfect in China. the insiders or major shareholders of the company can influence the financial and operating decisions, and therefore capital investment of listed companies also Reflected the aggressive behavior characteristics. Over control of major shareholders within the company to play a governance mechanism, but also seriously hindered the healthy development of capital markets, and disrupted the normal order of market economy. The Ownership Structure Reform is to change the unreasonable ownership structure and make it improvement.In this paper, we made a systematic Review of foreign investment behavior, and combined with our Ownership Structure characteristics that major shareholders controlling, taking into account the split share structure Reform, ownership structure may lead to lead to change and improve the corporate governance mechanism, The major shareholders of listed companies under the control of capital investment behavior, also investigated the impact that split share structure Reform under the control of large shareholders lead to the investment behaviorsThe Results showed that:the existing ownership structure, largest shareholder due to the dominance, weakened corporate governance mechanism, all this lead the over-investment is a common behavior of listed companies, and investment has free cash flow-sensitive, the more free cash flow, the more serious over-investment; compared to non-state-owned listed companies, state-owned listed companies over investment more serious; the increasing of cash flow rights cue the over-investment behavior of listed companies, and Reduce the separation of ownership and help alleviate the occurrence of over-investment; the split share structure Reform improving governance, promoting the role of corporate governance mechanisms, and its ease over-investment behavior in the list company.【关键词】股权分置改革 大股东控制 两权分离 股权性质 资本性投资【英文关键词】Split share structure Reform large shareholders separation of ownership Ownership Type capital investment【目录】后股权分置时期大股东控制与公司资本性投资 摘要 5-6 Abstract 6 第一章 绪论 9-20 1.1 选题背景与研究意义 9-10 1.1.1 选题背景 9 1.1.2 研究意义 9-10 1.2 国内外研究综述 10-17 1.2.1 国外研究动态 10-12 1.2.2 国内研究动态 12-17 1.2.3 国内外研究现状述评与小结 17 1.3 研究内容,方法和主要创新 17-20 1.3.1 研究内容和内容框架 17-18 1.3.2 研究方法 18-19 1.3.3 主要创新 19-20 第二章 企业投资的相关理论基础 20-25 2.1 相关概念的界定 20 2.1.1 大股东控制与内部人控制 20 2.1.2 现金流权和控制权及两权分离 20 2.1.3 资本性投资 20 2.2 企业投资的相关理论 20-24 2.2.1 新古典框架下的投资理论 20-22 2.2.2 基于代理理论的企业投资理论 22-23 2.2.3 基于信息不对称的企业投资理论 23-24 2.3 本章小结 24-25 第三章 我国公司治理结构及大股东控制下的投资行为 25-31 3.1 我国上市公司治理结构及股权安排 25-28 3.1.1 我国上市公司股权特征及治理机制现状评述 25-27 3.1.2 控股股东的存在与公司治理 27-28 3.2 控股股东控制权收益与企业投资行为 28-30 3.2.1 大股东对上市公司的利益侵占与企业投资行为 28-30 3.3 本章小结 30-31 第四章 股权分置改革与大股东控制下的企业投资行为 31-33 4.1 股权分置改革概述 31 4.1.1 股权分置的由来及其弊端 31 4.1.2 股权分置改革的意义 31 4.2 股权分置改革对企业股权结构及公司投资行为的影响 31-33 第五章 实证研究设计及实证结果分析 33-46 5.1 研究假设 33-34 5.2 样本及数据来源 34 5.3 模型建立与变量定义 34-36 5.3.1 模型设定 34-35 5.3.2 变量定义说明 35-36 5.3.3 实证研究方